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“Litigation-generated science” came to center
stage in Judge Alex Kosinski’s 1995 decision
in the Ninth Circuit remand of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. There,
Kosinski asserts 
that the testimony proffered by an expert is
based directly on legitimate, preexisting research
unrelated to the litigation provides the most persua-
sive basis for concluding that the opinions he
expresses were ‘derived by the scientiﬁc method.’
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1995)
Conversely, he indicates that research
undertaken to support litigation should bear
a special burden to demonstrate its admissi-
bility. Here, Kosinski uses a narrow deﬁnition
of litigation-generated science to refer to
studies that begin after litigation is initiated
(and probably after the expert is hired) and is
funded by one of the parties or their attor-
neys. The contrast is with 
experts whose ﬁndings ﬂow from existing research
[who thus] are less likely to have been biased
toward a particular conclusion by the promise of
remuneration; when an expert prepares reports
and ﬁndings before being hired as a witness, that
record will limit the degree to which he can tailor
his testimony to serve a party’s interests. (Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1995)
Judge Kosinski implies that experts con-
ducting research to support litigation do not
follow the norms of science, and that they are
at high risk of engaging in scientiﬁc miscon-
duct or even fraud. Implicitly, his view is that
expert witnesses are more “willing to say
whatever is needed to advance the cause of
the party that hires them” (Haack, in press).
In singling out scientific testimony for
enhanced “gatekeeping” requirements by the
trial court, the Daubert opinion noted the
words of Judge Jack Weinstein about the
power of scientiﬁc authority and its potential
to mislead:
Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difﬁculty in evaluating
it. Because of this risk, the judge, in weighing pos-
sible prejudice against probative force under
R.403 of the present rules, exercises more control
over experts than over lay witnesses. (Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1993)
The argument is that research done for a
speciﬁc case is especially subject to manipula-
tion but that the evidence is both difﬁcult for
juries to evaluate and unusually persuasive.
On the surface this seems reasonable, or at
least plausible, but a hard look at the question
of litigation-generated science makes some of
the easy distinctions problematic.
The question comes to us in the context of
the judicial landscape after the Daubert deci-
sion and its successors, Kumho and Joiner
(Berger 2005). Since the 1993 Daubert deci-
sion, federal judges (and state judges where
individual states have followed the Daubert
pattern) are required to give more careful
scrutiny to the relevance and reliability of
adversarial expert evidence. Empirical evidence
is scanty, but many observers believe that after
Daubert the parties in civil cases have had
more difﬁculty getting their scientiﬁc evidence
heard by juries (Berger 2005; Dixon and Gill
2001; Krafka et al. 2002). If true, this places a
special burden on plaintiffs, who have an afﬁr-
mative requirement to demonstrate their case,
which can be dismissed on summary judgment
if their evidence is excluded.
How well Daubert serves the goal of jus-
tice has been hotly debated. This present arti-
cle does not join that debate. Rather, we focus
on the narrower question of whether, under
Daubert or any other framework, litigation-
generated science should be treated differently
from other science offered as evidence in the
courtroom. We also address a boundary ques-
tion: What science is litigation generated, and
what science is not, or, indeed, does the
boundary itself make any sense?
Our analysis begins with a discussion of
science done explicitly to support litigation.
We contend that concern about this science is
largely because of the financial incentives of
scientific experts to obtain results that sup-
port the position of the parties that hired
them. We then show that this concept of
interest applies to a much larger set of studies,
many of which are not explicitly litigation
related and are done before any litigation
commences. We also address the argument
that litigation-generated research has not
been peer reviewed and is therefore less trust-
worthy. We contend that peer review,
although an important and useful tool for
improving scientiﬁc publications, has signiﬁ-
cant limitations when used by judges to
determine the reliability of scientiﬁc studies.
And we suggest that cross-examination by
attorneys aided by competent experts may
serve the ends of justice at least as well as peer
review. We conclude there is not a sufﬁcient
case for treating certain kinds of litigation-
generated science differently.
Litigation-Generated Science,
Type 1
We begin with two questions about Judge
Kosinski’s definition of litigation-generated
science—research undertaken to support
litigation—which we will call litigation-
generated science, type 1 (LGS1). First, we
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reliable than research done before litigation.
We can quickly dispose of this question
because we are aware of no empirical research
that demonstrates this and certainly none that
would survive a Daubert hearing on this issue.
It is true that authors have offered anecdotal
examples of good and bad litigation-generated
science, but there are no rigorous analyses
comparing the quality of studies done for
litigation with other studies.
Second, are there any relevant distinctions
between LGS1 science and other science? In
our context we sharpen this question by ask-
ing if the incentives to do biased studies are
qualitatively different for LGS1 science com-
pared with those for non-LGS1 science. Stated
differently, if an expert has done research to
support a court case either as an employee or
as a hired consultant, to what extent should a
judge be concerned about the expert’s bias,
and how it might affect the quality of the
study beyond that of any other scientist?
On its face, doing science for the purpose
of supporting one side or another in a legal
proceeding would seem to have built-in incen-
tives to “paint the target around the arrow,”
and there is little doubt this happens with
some LGS1, as it does for testimony about
non-LGS1 science. Indeed, this potential
exists for almost any testimony, even that of
fact witnesses. But Judge Kosinski further
seems to assume that science done before liti-
gation is not subject to bias because it is sci-
ence done without knowing what the “right
answer” should be. We know this blank slate
view of scientific practice is not strictly true
because scientists’ attitudes and interests can
affect their research, so Judge Kosinski implic-
itly suggests that any motives other than
money have relatively small effects or work
equally on both sides and thus “cancel out.”
Follow the money? What kind of incen-
tives or disincentives might be present for a
scientist doing LGS1 that would be absent in
other settings? The obvious and primary one
is money. Experts who do research and testify
in court cases are typically well compensated.
These economic incentives can be quantiﬁed,
which allows the strength and nature of the
incentive to be more easily understood than
other kinds of motivators (e.g., academic pro-
motion, professional reputation, personal atti-
tudes). Often it is not just the lump sum
involved with a professional fee or salary that
is the economic incentive. Future business or
continued employment may be even more
powerful. The fact that these incentives (and
their complementary disincentives) are widely
shared and experienced gives psychological
cogency to the economic dimension as a
problematic aspect of litigation-driven science
and expert testimony. Buttressing the eco-
nomic dimension, the social relationship
between funder and scientist can even affect
the attitudes of scientists who seek to main-
tain a disinterested perspective. Moreover,
this may occur without any consciousness of
bias on the part of the expert (Freudenberg
2008). This problem also exists for any
employee of a company who does science on
its behalf.
Various departures from the norm, such
as fraud, data falsification, selective use of
data, and the systematic skewing of interpre-
tations, all occur to some extent outside the
courtroom, too. But in what way do eco-
nomic incentives speciﬁcally make a scientist
more likely to act in a manner that violates
the usual norms of science? Someone who has
a valuable product is also less likely to spoil
the brand by providing unsatisfactory mer-
chandise (as seen by the client). Scientists
hired to support litigation often command
high fees. Employee scientist witnesses have a
different but equally obvious problem: It is
not their fee but their whole livelihood that
might be at stake.
Conflicts of interest in science. All this
suggests that LGS1 boils down to a special
case of science funded by parties with an
interest in the outcome—conﬂicts of interest
in science (Krimsky 2003, 2005). We can
reframe the LGS1 issue in this way: A
researcher who conducts a study funded by a
party in a court case has a ﬁnancial conﬂict of
interest, and the court’s concern is that this
conﬂict will lead the researcher to conduct the
study or interpret the results in a manner
designed to suit that party. If this is the rea-
soning that underpins the extra Daubert hur-
dle for LGS1 studies, we need to ask if other
(non-LGS1) studies are immune from the
same concerns. We think not.
A growing body of scholarship has consis-
tently raised concerns about bias generated by
conflicts of interest outside of LGS1, for
example, safety and efﬁcacy studies funded by
pharmaceutical companies. Overall, com-
pared with studies by researchers without
financial conflicts of interest, such studies
have been found to have conclusions more
favorable to the companies funding them
(Als-Nielsen et al. 2003; Bekelman et al.
2003; Friedman and Richter 2004; Lexchin
et al. 2003; Perlis et al. 2005; Stelfox et al.
1998). In addition, biomedical industry rela-
tionships are associated with delay in report-
ing research results (Blumenthal et al. 1997,
2006). When these delays are caused by pro-
prietary or trade secret concerns, they also
violate scientiﬁc norms.
The ﬁnancial conﬂict of interest in these
allegedly nonlitigation studies is clear.
Approval of new drugs can literally add bil-
lions of dollars to annual profits. To obtain
approval, companies must demonstrate safety
and efficacy. Failure to show either can lead
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to delay or ultimately deny approval.
Thus, the companies funding drug trials obvi-
ously need and want results that support their
applications. This research is begun well in
advance of any possible liability litigation and
not explicitly to support a position in a law-
suit. But such research purporting to demon-
strate safety could be used later by companies
defending themselves against suits by individ-
uals who allege they were injured by the phar-
maceutical in question and, although not
LGS1 by Judge Kosinski’s definition, serve
the same purpose and work in the same way.
Scientists and companies are aware of this
aspect of safety research conducted before a
product hits the market (Haack, in press).
A similar example is found in studies to
support U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) premarket registration or rereg-
istration of pesticides. Here, as in the FDA
case, manufacturers fund safety studies even
though there is a clear conﬂict of interest. The
U.S. EPA does not object and even requires
these studies. As with pharmaceuticals, safety
studies are also available to defend liability
lawsuits, and manufacturers and consultant or
employee scientists are aware of this.
Similarly, chemical manufacturers conduct
research in support of the safety of their prod-
ucts. Even when these products do not
require licensing, research can satisfy the
safety concerns of purchasers and, again, can
prove valuable if liability litigation should
ensue (or dangerous if they reveal evidence of
a hazard).
Science can also be done with litigation in
mind but not connected to a particular case,
requirement, or licensing application. Large
corporations often invest strategically in
research agendas whose objective is to develop
a body of scientific evidence favorable to a
particular economic interest or useful for
defending against particular claims of legal
liability (see “LGS2: Strategic Science and
Manufactured Doubt”). The use of “neutral”
trade associations or for-hire industrial
research laboratories has a long history that
has been detailed in other published articles
(Michaels and Monforton 2005; Ozonoff
1988; Proctor 1996).
Direct funding of a specific study by an
interested party is not the only dimension of
financial conflict of interest. Financial con-
flicts can be generated by funding of other
studies, research-related gifts, board member-
ship, and stock ownership. Indeed, studies of
physician behavior show that payments for
meals, conference travel, and continuing edu-
cation affect physician prescribing practices
(Wazana 2000). It is not clear why direct
funding by interested parties of prelitigation
studies or these other conﬂicts of interest dif-
fer qualitatively from LGS1.
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which virtually all research presented in court
is LGS1. When an employer is charged with a
pattern of workplace discrimination, the most
convincing evidence is a statistical study of
hiring, termination, promotion, and wage
patterns. Such a study would virtually never
be undertaken before discrimination had been
alleged. If it were difﬁcult to use such studies
in litigation, plaintiffs claiming discrimina-
tion would be greatly disadvantaged.
As a ﬁnal observation about what is differ-
ent about LGS1, we note there are certain types
of expert testimony employing scientiﬁc meth-
ods that are done routinely only for court cases.
Accident reconstruction is a prime example.
And there are some allegedly scientiﬁc methods
that have been researched and designed to be
used almost exclusively by one side in a legal
setting, for example, fingerprint analysis.
Because of the speciﬁcity of these studies, many
might not consider them “scientiﬁc,” although
they use all the same techniques and modes of
reasoning. The only difference is that they have
restricted generalizability. But the same is true
of studies using scientific methods done
expressly for a single case. Why should LGS1
studies be any more objectionable than acci-
dent reconstruction or ﬁngerprint identiﬁca-
tion? There is good reason to argue that, for
example, forensic testimony, is no less litiga-
tion related and potentially at least as prone to
conﬂicts as a study that meets the requirements
of Judge Kosinski’s deﬁnition (Jasanoff 2006;
Risinger and Saks 2003). Indeed, the Kumho
decision, extending the reach of the Daubert
ruling to all expert testimony based on “techni-
cal” or “other specialized knowledge” (Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael 1999), explicitly
acknowledges this.
LGS2: Strategic Science and
Manufactured Doubt
We return now to other kinds of “litigation-
driven science,” science done to establish the
safety of a speciﬁc substance, product, or pro-
cedure; science done with the strategic aim of
spoiling science that might at some future
point become inconvenient; or science done to
establish results that might be useful against a
competitor (e.g., in patent infringement or
market share). We refer to this as LGS2.
All the incentives and conﬂicts of interest
we discussed with LGS1 pertain here, as well.
A major difference is one of time scale. LGS1
usually has a time-constrained application,
although given the drawn-out nature of legal
battle today, even this distinction does not
always apply. A second difference is that LGS2
may have more than one goal. Its explicit goal
may be to support FDA approval of a drug or
to support claims of safety for an industrial or
consumer product. But, it is easy to see that
evidence of safety in support of a marketing
effort can be used later to defend against
claims of harm. We can think of both LGS1
and LGS2 as subsets of strategic science.
One can even make the argument that
LGS2 is even more likely to mislead than
LGS1. Well-financed industries have the
resources to seed the literature with strategic
science. Take, for example, a line of argument
designed to show that certain kinds of chemi-
cally induced animal tumors are not relevant
to human risk assessment (Melnick et al.
1996, 2008). This can be used to make a case
that such animal studies should be excluded.
There is a covert litigation-driven relationship
between LGS2 and the general literature that
is currently less likely to be subjected to the
same additional scrutiny routinely applied to
science that is explicitly case speciﬁc.
This raises another important issue: poten-
tial defendants in toxic tort litigation (and law
enforcement officials on the criminal side)
have the resources to conduct or fund research
valuable for litigation that has contingent
value, but potential civil plaintiffs (and crimi-
nal defendants) do not. Although a few plain-
tiffs (or defendants in criminal trials) might
avail themselves of LGS1, the option of preliti-
gation research (LGS2) is closed to them. The
litigation setting may be the only venue in
which civil plaintiffs have access to science
done on their behalf. Even worse, in many
cases, the vast majority of—or all—research
on a product’s hazards may be conducted
under the sponsorship of its manufacturers or
by researchers with industry ties. If the legal
system treats LGS1 as highly suspect but treats
prelitigation research as without conflict, it
places its thumb on the scales of justice.
Much of the research that characterizes
hazards is funded by the interested parties,
because they have the resources, access, oblig-
ation, and expertise to conduct this kind of
research. Indeed, a recent study of biomedical
research shows that 57% of biomedical
research funding in 2003 came from industry,
compared with 28% from the National
Institutes of Health (Moses et al. 2005).
Nearly $100 billion was spent on biomedical
research in 2003 (Moses et al. 2005), and
expenditures have certainly surpassed that
amount by now. Although there are no data
on this, it is plausible that funding for plain-
tiff-oriented research is a very small propor-
tion of the total. Setting hurdles before such
science—science that is indeed required in
many regulatory proceedings—would seem
both undesirable and counterintuitive (Henry
and Conrad 2008). Exclusion or a rebuttable
presumption against both LGS1 and LGS2
would have a disproportionately negative
impact on plaintiffs by excluding much of the
available evidence. With no evidence to pre-
sent to the jury, the plaintiff cannot prevail.
Moreover, the arguments presented against
LGS1 apply with equal force not only to
LGS2 but also to all expert testimony. The
Kosinski remedy implies that experts hired by
any party to a dispute often are not reliable
and should be excluded.
Of course, LGS1 produces scientific
results obtained speciﬁcally for a case. Perhaps
the questions, observations, and methods
would thereby be subject to bias or manipula-
tion in a way that would allow the testifying
expert to build a stronger case. On the other
hand, when testifying about the state of preex-
isting scientiﬁc literature or standards of prac-
tice, this extra degree of freedom is removed.
However, it could also be argued that there is
more freedom to interpret science not speciﬁ-
cally tied to the facts of a particular case.
Cherry-picking the literature is one manifesta-
tion of this, but it is not uncommon for two
scientists to interpret the same study very dif-
ferently. And the litigation setting can both
uncover and highlight such differences.
Conﬂicting expert interpretations of scientiﬁc
studies in the courts and in regulatory settings
remain the rule not the exception. In most
cases, the studies under question were not
done expressly to support a party to litigation
(Jasanoff 1990, 1996). We lack data about
whether LGS1 or more general studies provide
greater latitude for interpretation, so these
speculations remain unveriﬁed.
The antidote to either LGS1 or LGS2 is
not to use the litigation motive as a blunt
instrument for exclusion but as a commonsense
argument for expanded discovery and greater
latitude for cross-examination by the parties.
This is particularly true for LGS2, where com-
pany motives that appear unrelated to the case
at hand may be highly pertinent. This clearly
presents itself in Blum v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals (1997), elegantly presented and
discussed by Susan Haack (in press).
The Role of Peer Review 
and Publication in 
Scientiﬁc Journals
One argument for excluding LGS1 studies is
that the specific nature and shorter time
frame make them less likely to undergo the
usual conventions of scientific peer review.
Peer review can provide a check on science
that is poorly designed, does not conform to
established conventions, adopts arbitrary
methods, or is poorly written. Such science is
less likely to be accepted in peer-reviewed
journals. Peer review is also important in
encouraging scientists to refine underlying
models and arguments. Still, we know that
peer reviewers frequently disagree about
whether to accept papers (Rothwell and
Martyn 2000). We also know that poorly
designed and analyzed studies can easily
receive favorable reviews (Curfman et al.
2006; Smith 2006). Indeed, many published
Litigation-generated science
Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 116 | NUMBER 1 | January 2008 119articles undergo only the most cursory peer
review (Jasanoff 2008). Either via poor judg-
ment or conscious intention, scientists choose
study topics, opt for study designs, do analy-
ses, and interpret results in ways that bias
conclusions in one direction or another
(Melnick et al. 2008). Sometimes, peer review
will reject such studies, but often it will not.
In addition, unlike the idealized image of peer
review, the decisions of peer reviewers often
do not determine publication. Editors always
have the final say, so well-reviewed articles
may not be published, whereas at the same
time, editors approve publication of poorly
reviewed studies (Jasanoff 1990). Moreover,
although peer review may expose weak study
design or lapses in a scientist’s understanding
or logic, it is unlikely to detect any but the
most blatant fraud or scientific misconduct
(Smith 2006). Here we differ with the ideal-
ized picture of peer review presented by
Henry and Conrad (2008). Peer review is not
a remedy for Judge Kosinski’s concerns [see
also Jasanoff (1990)].
Legal cases sometimes engender research
to fill a void in scientific knowledge or to
answer questions speciﬁc to a given setting. In
such cases, the peer review process may be too
slow and cumbersome to provide timely infor-
mation to the legal system. Alternatively,
research appropriate to answer factual ques-
tions critical to a legal case may be too narrow
to warrant peer-reviewed publication, even if
its methods are impeccable. In other cases,
innovative methods may be exactly the type
needed to answer questions of fact raised in
litigation, although they may fare poorly in
peer review that rewards “inside the box”
thinking and penalizes the new idea or
method. Many classic articles in economics,
including seminal articles that eventually led
to the awarding of Nobel Prizes, had great dif-
ficulty being accepted for publication (Gans
and Shepherd 1994). These points are recog-
nized in the Daubert opinion (Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1993):
In some instances well-grounded but innovative
theories will not have been published. . . . Some
propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new
or of too limited interest to be published.
Finally, peer-reviewed publication can be
manipulated by the parties to litigation. It can
“fall apart if lawyers and litigation experts
invade the realm of scientific research and
manipulate the medical and scientiﬁc publica-
tion system to achieve their litigation ends”
(Anderson et al. 2001).
Few, if any, journal peer-review processes
are as stringent or as probing as the usual
cross-examination performed in an adversarial
setting. It is simply not true that LGS1 studies
do not undergo peer review. Lawyers routinely
hire consultants to go over the minutiae of any
study offered up by the other side. Alleged
study ﬂaws are then used in cross-examination
to devalue or deconstruct the study in the eyes
of the jury.
We do not claim that peer review and
cross-examination are interchangeable. Each
is based on different assumptions, and each
operates in a different manner. Peer review
typically assumes that the submitted article is
an accurate representation of the underlying
research and that the research itself is honest
and not intentionally biased or misleading.
Peer review is a ﬁlter, designed to let through
research that is original and signiﬁcant, as well
as based on good data and a valid research
design. It also serves the functions of improv-
ing analysis and clarifying exposition. Overall,
peer review is designed to improve the quality
of the scientiﬁc literature. Conversely, cross-
examination assumes that research is designed
to buttress the opponent’s position and is
both biased and misleading and probably
poorly designed as well. Cross-examination is
designed to deconstruct and undermine the
credibility of an adversary’s expert testimony
or research, not to improve its quality
(Jasanoff 1992). By taking an adversarial
stance, cross-examination may reveal hidden
assumptions and errors not uncovered by peer
review (Jasanoff 1996).
Given these differences, cross-examination
may be a better tool than peer review to expose
purposefully misleading research. A competent
attorney, aided by competent experts, should
be in a better position to expose the ﬂaws in
such research than is the peer reviewer, who
often takes less time than the expert in a legal
case and has more limited resources to probe
than does the cross-examining attorney
(Jasanoff 1996).
Perhaps the strongest argument related to
peer review derives from the fact that LGS1 is
typically unpublished and therefore not
exposed to the scrutiny of the scientiﬁc com-
munity. One aspect of such scrutiny is that
publication may lead to new research that
contradicts the original ﬁndings. Perhaps more
important is that publication allows scientists’
work to be read by their scientific peers.
Scientists do not want their peers to read their
badly flawed or, even worse, dishonest
research. So, it may be possible that they are
willing to engage in such research within the
conﬁnes of a trial but would be unwilling to
submit it for publication. This is an argument
against all unpublished research, not just
LGS1, and it is also an argument against all
adversarial experts, not just scientists testifying
about LGS1.
This then comes back to the question of
the effectiveness of cross-examination in
revealing to the jury the nature of poorly done
and deceptive research. Cross-examination
by attorneys who have been briefed by their
own experts can accomplish the task and is
potentially more useful than conventional
publication peer review.
LGS1 and LGS2 and the
Objective of the Research
Endeavor
We have already noted that a possibly relevant
difference between case-speciﬁc scientiﬁc evi-
dence and more general evidence of science is
the purpose for which it is done. Presumably,
the goal of non-case-specific science is less
applied and more general.
But a great deal of “normal” science is
quite applied, especially in the area of toxicol-
ogy and epidemiology. This is true in particu-
lar for all regulatory science. Experiments or
observational studies of chromium exposure
are not done for the purpose of disinterested
knowledge but because knowledge of the
health effects of chromium is important and
relevant for practical purposes—to protect
workers and the general public from harm.
To the extent that the implications are evi-
dent to all concerned (the scientists, research
funders, readers), there seems to be little dif-
ference regarding the objective. In the case-
specific instance, there may be tighter
constraints that answer narrower questions
because generalizations to other populations
are not as important, but this is a matter of
degree, not of kind.
Whether it is LGS1, LGS2, or neither, the
desire to have the expert “just be a scientist” is
doomed to failure. Science (litigation gener-
ated or not) is presented at trial by partisan
expert witnesses. These experts use scientific
evidence to advocate for a position and, in the
process, transform it into a tool of advocacy.
Even when the science is the same, what
Jasanoff (2008) calls the “argument and repre-
sentation” are different. As it is presented at
trial, even normal science is integrated into an
advocacy narrative and becomes unmoored
from the discourse of science as practiced out-
side the litigation context. The usual rhetoric
of science is displaced by the rhetoric of court-
room testimony that separates the common
“on the one hand, on the other hand” narra-
tive by a single scientist to one where the “two
hands” are represented by two different
experts. Even before any evidence is presented,
the expressive landscape is contoured in a fash-
ion that already is far from that of normal sci-
ence. The court may not see as helpful,
common modes of scientific discourse (care-
fully qualiﬁed conclusions, probabilistic con-
clusions, acknowledging the possible validity
of other points of view, and so forth). The
courtroom does not want normal science nor
is it particularly useful to the triers of fact.
Complaints that LGS1 distorts the discourse
of science are therefore misplaced at the out-
set. If that is the problem, then no scientific
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then is whether there is something special
about the kinds of departures from normal
science caused by LGS1.
The Daubert decision requires trial courts
to address the questions of reliability and rele-
vance, thus returning to the question of
whether the actual scientific methods used
were relevant and reliable. So we appear to
have returned to our starting point. But this,
too, is more problematic than it appears. If
this means that the actual techniques used
(e.g., chromatography or logistic regression)
are in keeping with what is generally consid-
ered proper and acceptable, Daubert reverts to
the Frye standard—that the methods or sci-
entiﬁc principles used are “generally accepted”
by the scientiﬁc community. If on other other
hand, it means that the courts should address
the more difﬁcult “demarcation problem” of
separating science from pseudoscience, judges
will find themselves over their heads in the
deep waters of controverted epistemology. As
we have seen, it is difficult even to discern
what methodologic or epistemologic criteria
could separate litigation-generated science
from other kinds of science.
Disclosure as a Response to
the Question of Bias
Bias of the type Judge Kosinski alleges is a
problem that goes beyond the courtroom.
Biomedical journals have faced the problem
of conflict of interest for a long time. Many
journals do not require disclosure of conﬂicts
of interest, but now more than 600 have
agreed to follow the manuscript requirements
of the International Committee for Medical
Journal Editors (2006) on this subject.
Authors submitting articles to these journals
must disclose all relationships that might
involve the appearance of a conﬂict of inter-
est, and they must disclose study funding.
Journal editors will publish this information if
they think it might be important for readers.
Articles submitted to the journals should be
accompanied by signed statements by authors
stating that they control the data, analysis, the
writing of reports, and submission for publi-
cation. Authors must describe any involve-
ment of sponsors in any of these aspects of
the study. Editors may include this informa-
tion if they publish a submitted paper and
may also use the information as an input into
the decision to accept or reject a submission.
Academic journals address financial con-
flicts of interest through disclosure, which
alerts editors, reviewers, and readers to the
potential for bias where conflicts exist. This
can lead to greater scrutiny of studies that may
be affected by such bias. Disclosure is not a
panacea. Disclosure and scrutiny will not nec-
essarily prevent systematic distortions of the
scientific literature, even when individual
studies are conducted using appropriate meth-
ods of data collection and analysis. Sponsors
with control over publication can decide
which studies to submit, possibly choosing
preferentially to submit favorable studies and
thus biasing the overall literature on safety or
efficacy (Blumenstyk 2003; Dickersin et al.
1992; Easterbrook et al. 1991; Goozner and
DelViscio 2004). Still, disclosure does allow
readers (or jurors) to engage in greater scrutiny
when conﬂict of interest is present. 
Where Does That Leave Us?
LGS1 is part of the class of research studies
involving possible conflicts of interest. The
larger set, in which LGS1 is included, also
comprises studies of safety and efficacy
ﬁnanced by companies that rely on such stud-
ies to obtain licenses to sell their products or
that rely on them to promote sales, prelitiga-
tion studies financed by parties for product
research and development, regulatory science
done to influence standards, and scientific
work done for criminal litigation, such as ﬁn-
gerprints and handwriting, as well as accident
reconstruction. All these can raise questions
about possible bias for researchers when they
work for any party that has an interest in the
outcome of the studies.
This does not mean there are no differ-
ences between LGS1 and LGS2 studies.
LGS1 can be designed to be more pertinent
to a specific case than preexisting science is
likely to be. This, however, is not necessarily
a defect. The upside of relevance is that stud-
ies can be designed to provide data that
directly address the legal issues, for example,
causation. Indeed, such evidence is often
lacking when litigation commences, and
case-specific fact-finding can be more effi-
cient precisely because it is more targeted.
Other studies of a particular health problem
may have been done using populations that
differ in some important aspect from the
plaintiffs in a toxic tort suit, but litigation-
generated studies, of outcome or exposure or
both, can be done using a population of
which the plaintiff is a member. Because they
are more relevant to the case being adjudi-
cated, they can provide better evidence than
other studies might. On the other hand,
because they are done under the shadow of a
conflict of interest, the court may be con-
cerned they are biased. Judge Kosinski’s deci-
sion asserted that the resulting biases were
always and necessarily of a special nature. It is
this contention we have addressed—and
questioned—here.
Where does this leave us? We think the
courts are rightly advised to be wary of LGS1.
However, there seem no strong reasons to
treat this conﬂict of interest differently from
other relevant conﬂicts of interest. Drawing a
bright line at the moment litigation begins
may be convenient for the court, but it does
not serve the interests of justice. And because
justice is a primary goal of the legal system, it
would seem unwise to construct an unfairly
high and one-size-fits-all evidentiary hurdle
for science involving conflicts of interest
(Jasanoff 2005). In the adversarial and many
other settings, such science would involve evi-
dence that is almost certainly relevant. But
partial application to only some instances of
conflict, for example, the exclusion of evi-
dence about causation in toxic tort cases,
potentially creates imbalances. The conse-
quences of evidentiary exclusion differ for
plaintiffs and defendants because plaintiffs
have the initial burden of presenting evidence.
If neither side produces adequate evidence to
support its contentions, the plaintiff loses.
Excluding defense expert testimony makes
defending a case more difficult. Excluding
plaintiffs’ expert testimony makes bringing a
case impossible.
The focus on excluding postlitigation sci-
ence affects plaintiffs and defendants
unequally because of this burden and because
the parties have unequal resources and oppor-
tunities to generate prelitigation science.
What Henry and Conrad (2008) have stated
with respect to regulatory science would seem
to hold, as well, for assuring fairness in the
trial setting:
In effect, Congress and the courts have deter-
mined that in an open, democratic society that is
administered by a bureaucracy that is required to
act fairly and rationally, it is important that agen-
cies allow interested or affected persons to provide
information to them, and fairly consider that
information.
The courts have one method of dealing
with conﬂict of interest not available to scien-
tiﬁc journals and their readers: cross-examina-
tion. With their own experts as consultants,
attorneys have become adept at deconstruct-
ing the research and arguments of opposing
experts. They also can point out to the jury
when research presented by an expert has
been funded by and controlled by a party to
the litigation. Some may consider allowing
the jury to hear such evidence an abdication
of judicial responsibilities under Daubert
(Anderson et al. 2001). However, if a study
appears to be relevant and there is no speciﬁc
evidence that it was improperly designed or
executed, suspicions generated by conﬂicts of
interest are within the scope of jury compe-
tence. Juries may sometimes ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
understand complex science, but most under-
stand conflicts of interest and can judge the
science presented to them with that in mind.
The problems with litigation-generated
science are not special. On the contrary, they
are very general and apply to much or most
science that is relevant and reliable in the
courtroom setting.
Litigation-generated science
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